United Nations A/55/916–S/2001/419

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2001
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 20 (d) and 46

Security Council
Fifty-sixth session

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Letter dated 26 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a document entitled "The conceptual approaches of Kazakhstan to resolving the situation in Afghanistan" (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20 (d) and 46 of its fifty-fifth session.

(*Signed*) Madina B. **Jarbussynova**
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

01-35361 (E) 030501 030501

Annex to the letter dated 26 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The conceptual approaches of Kazakhstan to resolving the situation in Afghanistan

An analysis of the situation that is developing in Afghanistan shows that it is continuing to remain complicated and unpredictable, that there has been no significant progress in settling the conflict, and that the efforts made by the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other interested countries have not led to the desired results.

The ongoing war, the transformation of Afghanistan into one of the largest world centres for the production and export of narcotic drugs, the concentration in that country of an enormous amount of weapons, and the existence of centres for training terrorist groups are contributing to the increase in tension in the region and represent a real threat to the stability and security of Central Asia and the entire world community.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the lack of positive results in bringing about an Afghan settlement is linked to the determination of the warring Afghan sides to settle the conflict solely by military means and also the unwillingness of the States concerned, having abandoned their geopolitical ambitions, to address the Afghan problem in real earnest. The trend towards an escalation of the military and political situation in Afghanistan as well as the instances in which military and other assistance has been provided to the warring Afghan groups by individual States in the region are evidence of this.

In this connection, Kazakhstan bases its position on the following conceptual approaches to resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

1. Kazakhstan fully supports the Secretary-General's position with regard to Afghanistan that the incursions in 1999 and 2000 by Islamic fighters into the territory of Central Asian countries once again underscore the danger of the spread of a conflict and the need for a comprehensive approach, not a partial one, to settling the Afghan crisis.

In this connection, Kazakhstan advocates the strict implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan as well as the statements by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan demanding the non-interference in its internal affairs and the halting of the delivery of weapons to the warring Afghan groups.

Concerned about this state of affairs, the President of Kazakhstan, N. A. Nazarbayev, during the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in September 2000, called for the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council devoted to a consideration of the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia in order to develop practical measures for stabilizing it.

Kazakhstan views such a meeting not as a single act. It is clear that such a highly complicated problem as Afghanistan cannot be solved by simply holding a meeting, even of such an elevated forum as the United Nations Security Council. We

consider the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan as a preliminary step leading to the beginning of a process in which the international community takes a number of large-scale, comprehensive political, economic and humanitarian measures. In our opinion, such a meeting would enable the countries concerned to take a new look at the Afghan problem, highlight the defects and shortcomings of what has been done by the international community, and also indicate further possibilities for ensuring that the process of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is carried out through peaceful means. It is important for this process to be conducted with the strict and ongoing monitoring of the Security Council. This will be a serious signal for all Afghan groups that the world community, under the auspices of the United Nations, intends to deal comprehensively and in real earnest with the Afghan problem until it is completely solved. This will also demonstrate the firm intention of the community of nations to allocate the necessary economic and financial resources for these purposes.

In our view, good political will on the part of all participants in the peace process is a mandatory requirement for creating a constructive atmosphere at such a meeting. Otherwise, any attempts by the international community to settle the conflict will meet with failure.

2. Kazakhstan considers that the efforts by States must be aimed at instilling in the Afghan people hope that the world community will be able to provide large-scale assistance in restoring the economy of Afghanistan, which has been destroyed by war. It is, therefore, extremely important that the neighbouring countries and interested countries strictly adhere to the principles set forth in the Tashkent Declaration on the results of the meeting of the six-plus-two group, which calls upon the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan that are members of the group to prohibit the transit through their territory of military, technical and material assistance for the warring Afghan groups.

3. Kazakhstan believes that individual measures — either an embargo on the delivery of weapons or sporadic actions to combat drug trafficking — will not have a long-term effect. These measures must become an integral part of a general plan for the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan, which, together with an immediate ceasefire between the warring Afghan groups and the provision of international economic assistance, would include such elements as using the potential of Afghanistan's economic, political and intellectual elite which has emigrated from the country, establishing a system of State administration, reviving the ability of the peoples of Afghanistan to deal with their own problems, and solving the problems related to education, health care and restoring the historical and cultural heritage.

Accordingly, considering that Afghanistan at the current time has become a transitional political entity whose fate practically depends entirely on the correlation of interests and the degree to which foreign political figures are involved in its affairs, Kazakhstan believes that all interested States, including the member countries of the six-plus-two group (China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan plus the United States of America and the Russian Federation), the States members of the European Union (first and foremost, Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy and Sweden), a number of countries from the Asia region (Japan, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and India), the group of Arab States (first of all,

Saudi Arabia and Egypt), other countries from the Central Asian region (including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), the international financial institutions and the United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes (the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and so forth), and also other regional and international organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization for Economic Cooperation.

Furthermore, taking into account the international community's lack of a complete picture as to what is happening in Afghanistan, it is also necessary to use the mechanisms of the Rome, Bonn, Cyprus peace groups and other Afghan public organizations situated abroad in order to unify the database on Afghanistan and have a positive effect on the process of reactivating negotiations between the warring Afghan groups and of establishing a highly responsible Government in the future.

We welcome overall the idea of holding in Afghanistan a meeting of the *Loya Jirga*, the Council of Elders of the Afghan tribes, which in the past played an important role in the life of Afghan society and fulfilled the function of a body that regulated relations between the various tribes of the country. At the same time, this initiative should be developed in isolation from and independent of any narrow political, national or other interests on the part of the States involved in the peace process and interested States.

Obtaining a complete picture and information with regard to Afghanistan and the processes, measures, groups and so forth that are influencing the situation in the country is a most important task. Carrying out this task will enable the world community to work out adequate measures based on the real state of affairs. It is obvious that such a database must be concentrated in the United Nations.

4. Kazakhstan is firmly convinced that all international efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan must be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, which is an impartial mediator in the process of achieving peace and national harmony in Afghanistan. In this connection, Kazakhstan fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Mr. F. Vendrell, and the activities of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan and is ready to continue to provide them with the necessary assistance.

Kazakhstan believes, in this connection, that in order to achieve positive and practical results in resolving the situation in Afghanistan, the activities of the Special Mission and the six-plus-two group must be aimed at addressing the issues relating to openness and a readiness to take the initiative in their work, an adequate assessment of the military and political situation developing in the country, and devising a clear United Nations strategy with respect to the principles, means and forms of the Afghan settlement.

Today's realities require the international community to find new approaches to the assessment of the military and political situation and the geopolitical situation in the Central and South Asian region and develop an essentially new conception of the Afghan settlement, which must reflect the main causes of the conflict in Afghanistan, identify the internal and external forces supporting the warring parties and consider the possible consequences of the confrontation on a regional and international scale. Such a conception must include a programme, forms and

mechanisms for international intervention and the mobilization of financial and material resources.

It must include, if necessary, time limits for conducting peacemaking activities aimed at pushing the warring parties towards peace and measures for exerting influence on violators of the rules established for the period of the international community's intervention. There can be no doubt that, until such measures are adopted, interested countries must bring strong pressure to bear on the Afghan groups and factions under their control to force them to sit down at the negotiating table without any preconditions.

We are strongly convinced that it must be in the interest of the international community to have at the helm in Afghanistan a multi-ethnic, broadly representative and responsible Government that would fully guarantee internal security and stability, control the processes of the internal reconstruction and development of all spheres of life in Afghanistan and also ensure the conduct of a highly responsible foreign policy within the framework of a civilized dialogue with all countries on the basis of generally recognized international norms.

What Afghanistan will be — an Islamic or a secular State — is, in the final analysis, for Afghans themselves to decide. They must elect a government in the country without intrigues or outside interference. In pursuing such a policy, the international community must not show preference to one or other faction or group in Afghanistan, but instead should create the most favourable possible external conditions for launching a broad and comprehensive national dialogue in Afghanistan on the basis of the clear prospects of an all-round plan for the political, social and economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

5. While it welcomes overall the activities of the Afghanistan sanctions committee, Kazakhstan also supports a carefully thought out approach to the issue of introducing additional measures against the Afghan group known as the Taliban movement. Kazakhstan believes that sanctions, introduced as a necessary measure, must be justified by their ends. Precisely for that reason, the Security Council, before adopting additional measures, must carefully evaluate the impact of the sanctions currently in force on all aspects of resolving the situation in Afghanistan, and, first and foremost, their unintended consequences for the civilian population.

Experience shows that imposing tougher sanctions against the Taliban adversely affects the peace process and complicates the prospects for an intra-Afghan dialogue under United Nations auspices.

6. In future, Kazakhstan is ready to officially recognize a Government of Afghanistan that will be capable of truly uniting the Afghan people around it, ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms of all the nationalities in Afghanistan, addressing the country's internal problems responsibly and conducting a peaceful foreign policy.

Kazakhstan has no preconceived attitude towards any group or faction in Afghanistan. The coming to power in Afghanistan of the Taliban or their adversaries will not signify the arrival of the long-awaited peace in that country.

At the present time, however, more than 90 per cent of the country is formally under Taliban control. In this situation, it would be preferable to gradually move away from refusing all contact with them and to establish contacts with the

movement's leaders with a view to the possibility of convincing them to set about forming a responsible Government.

The Taliban's lack of official recognition must not be an obstacle to establishing contacts with the movement, which constitutes a real political force in Afghanistan and an integral or, in any case, a potential element of any future plan for the internal political reconstruction of the country. In this context, it makes sense to establish a direct dialogue with the Taliban at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, with mandatory observance of the international sanctions currently in force and the moratorium on official diplomatic recognition, which can be lifted only in exchange for flexibility on the part of Taliban with regard to fulfilling the demands of the international community. As stated above, all factors of political influence must be brought into play to that end, with the involvement of the aforementioned countries and organizations and of Afghan emigrés. The Taliban must see clearly and realize the advantages and prospects of cooperating with the international community and securing from it the necessary guarantees. The establishment of a dialogue precisely on this basis will, in our opinion, help to overcome the deadlock in dealing with the Afghan problem.

7. An analysis of the activities of the world's leading mass media shows that, as a result of the information vacuum that has formed around Afghanistan, the resources of the international community are being spent to address problems in other regions of the world, which are being given priority based on the political and economic interests of the key Powers. Kazakhstan wishes to emphasize, in this connection, the importance of filling this vacuum and actively moving the Afghan problem into the focus of the international community's attention through the world's leading mass media. The presentation of this problem must be balanced and show the unanimous desire of the world community to achieve the earliest possible settlement of the conflict, without a hint of preference for one group or another in Afghanistan. In other words, information on Afghanistan must be as objective as possible. The United Nations Department of Public Information must play its part in this area, as must the information agencies under its control, by developing an image strategy for drawing the attention of the international community to the problems of Afghanistan and accurate and regular reporting on the events taking place in that country.

8. Kazakhstan, in an expression of its good will, is prepared to assist as a mediator in reactivating the negotiating process. We are ready, in this connection, to organize a round of peace talks between the warring Afghan groups in Almaty. In making this proposal, Kazakhstan is not pursuing any political ambitions, nor has it any intention of competing with other States on this issue.

Kazakhstan does not aspire to leadership in the Afghan peace process and considers that such talks can take place in any State acceptable to the parties to the negotiations. The main criterion must be the agreement of the warring Afghan groups, in principle, to sit down at the negotiating table without preconditions and with a clearly agreed agenda for the talks.

Kazakhstan is also putting forward for discussion the idea of holding a high-level meeting of States and groups with real influence on the situation in Afghanistan for the purpose of discussing the regional situation. We believe that the most important condition for creating a constructive atmosphere of trust at such a meeting has to be an informal and open exchange of views on the whole range of

problems relating to Afghanistan, with no rigid agenda and without the adoption of any final documents or political or other statements on the issues discussed. We are prepared to hold such a meeting in Almaty. The rank of the participants in the meeting could initially be fixed at the level of experts, but only experts who are competent and fully conversant with the situation. In the event of a constructive dialogue, the format and level of meetings could be higher in the future.

The next stage in this regard could be the holding of a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which, as was noted above, would be a preliminary step towards the adoption by the international community of large-scale and comprehensive measures to resolve the situation in Afghanistan and would allow a United Nations conception of this problem to be developed.

It is clear that the holding of meetings at different levels can yield practical results only if there is a constructive atmosphere characterized by a serious attitude towards the Afghan problem and provided that the interested countries, having abandoned their geopolitical ambitions, cease providing military and material assistance to the warring Afghan groups, lay their cards on the table, work out common approaches to resolving the situation in Afghanistan and, as a first step, immediately set about forcing the warring Afghan groups to sit down at the negotiating table without any preconditions.

Notwithstanding that the belligerent parties are counting on settling the conflict by force, which involves their rejection of any peace initiative proposed by the interested States, there is, nevertheless, a need to make use of their dependence on outside sources for their military potential. Otherwise, peace conferences and meetings devoted to considering the situation in Afghanistan will prove to be ineffective and will be incapable of having a positive effect on the process of seeking a peaceful settlement.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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The ongoing war, the transformation of Afghanistan into one of the largest world centres for the production and export of narcotic drugs, the concentration in that country of an enormous amount of weapons, and the existence of centres for training terrorist groups are contributing to the increase in tension in the region and represent a real threat to the stability and security of Central Asia and the entire world community.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the lack of positive results in bringing about an Afghan settlement is linked to the determination of the warring Afghan sides to settle the conflict solely by military means and also the unwillingness of the States concerned to abandon their geopolitical ambitions and to address the Afghan problem in real earnest. The trend towards an escalation of the military and political situation in Afghanistan as well as the instances in which military and other assistance has been provided to the warring Afghan groups by individual States in the region are evidence of this.

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In our view, good political will on the part of all participants in the peace process is a mandatory requirement for creating a constructive atmosphere at such a meeting. Otherwise, any attempts by the international community to settle the conflict will meet with failure.

2. Kazakhstan considers that the efforts by States must be aimed at instilling in the Afghan people hope that the world community will be able to provide large-scale assistance in restoring the economy of Afghanistan, which has been destroyed by war. It is, therefore, extremely important that the neighbouring countries and interested countries strictly adhere to the principles set forth in the Tashkent Declaration on the results of the meeting of the six-plus-two group, which calls upon the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan that are members of the group to prohibit the transit through their territory of military, technical and material assistance for the warring Afghan groups.

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Accordingly, considering that Afghanistan at the current time has become a transitional political entity whose fate practically depends entirely on the correlation of interests and the degree to which foreign political figures are involved in its affairs, Kazakhstan believes that all interested States, including the member countries of the six-plus-two group (China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan plus the United States of America and the Russian Federation), the States members of the European Union (first and foremost, Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy and Sweden), a number of countries from the Asia region (Japan, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and India), the group of Arab States (first of all,

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Furthermore, taking into account the international community's lack of a complete picture as to what is happening in Afghanistan, it is also necessary to use the mechanisms of the Rome, Bonn, Cyprus peace groups and other Afghan public organizations situated abroad in order to unify the database on Afghanistan and have a positive effect on the process of reactivating negotiations between the warring Afghan groups and of establishing a highly responsible Government in the future.

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Obtaining a complete picture and information with regard to Afghanistan and the processes, measures, groups and so forth that are influencing the situation in the country is a most important task. Carrying out this task will enable the world community to work out adequate measures based on the real state of affairs. It is obvious that such a database must be concentrated in the United Nations.

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Kazakhstan believes, in this connection, that in order to achieve positive and practical results in resolving the situation in Afghanistan, the activities of the Special Mission and the six-plus-two group must be aimed at addressing the issues relating to openness and a readiness to take the initiative in their work, an adequate assessment of the military and political situation developing in the country, and devising a clear United Nations strategy with respect to the principles, means and forms of the Afghan settlement.

Today's realities require the international community to find new approaches to the assessment of the military and political situation and the geopolitical situation in the Central and South Asian region and develop an essentially new conception of the Afghan settlement, which must reflect the main causes of the conflict in Afghanistan, identify the internal and external forces supporting the warring parties and consider the possible consequences of the confrontation on a regional and international scale. Such a conception must include a programme, forms and

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The next stage in this regard could be the holding of a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which, as was noted above, would be a preliminary step towards the adoption by the international community of large-scale and comprehensive measures to resolve the situation in Afghanistan and would allow a United Nations conception of this problem to be developed.

It is clear that the holding of meetings at different levels can yield practical results only if there is a constructive atmosphere characterized by a serious attitude towards the Afghan problem and provided that the interested countries, having abandoned their geopolitical ambitions, cease providing military and material assistance to the warring Afghan groups, lay their cards on the table, work out common approaches to resolving the situation in Afghanistan and, as a first step, immediately set about forcing the warring Afghan groups to sit down at the negotiating table without any preconditions.

Notwithstanding that the belligerent parties are counting on settling the conflict by force, which involves their rejection of any peace initiative proposed by the interested States, there is, nevertheless, a need to make use of their dependence on outside sources for their military potential. Otherwise, peace conferences and meetings devoted to considering the situation in Afghanistan will prove to be ineffective and will be incapable of having a positive effect on the process of seeking a peaceful settlement.

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Annex to the letter dated 26 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The conceptual approaches of Kazakhstan to resolving the situation in Afghanistan

An analysis of the situation that is developing in Afghanistan shows that it is continuing to remain complicated and unpredictable, that there has been no significant progress in settling the conflict, and that the efforts made by the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other interested countries have not led to the desired results.

The ongoing war, the transformation of Afghanistan into one of the largest world centres for the production and export of narcotic drugs, the concentration in that country of an enormous amount of weapons, and the existence of centres for training terrorist groups are contributing to the increase in tension in the region and represent a real threat to the stability and security of Central Asia and the entire world community.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the lack of positive results in bringing about an Afghan settlement is linked to the determination of the warring Afghan sides to settle the conflict solely by military means and also the unwillingness of the States concerned, by abandoning their geopolitical ambitions, to address the Afghan problem in real earnest. The trend towards an escalation of the military and political situation in Afghanistan as well as the instances in which military and other assistance has been provided to the warring Afghan groups by individual States in the region are evidence of this.

In this connection, Kazakhstan bases its position on the following conceptual approaches to resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

1. Kazakhstan fully supports the Secretary-General's position with regard to Afghanistan that the incursions in 1999 and 2000 by Islamic fighters into the territory of Central Asian countries once again underscore the danger of the spread of a conflict and the need for a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal approach to settling the Afghan crisis.

In this connection, Kazakhstan advocates the strict implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan as well as the statements by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan demanding the non-interference in its internal affairs and the halting of the delivery of weapons to the warring Afghan groups.

Concerned about this state of affairs, the President of Kazakhstan, N. A. Nazarbayev, during the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in September 2000, called for the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council devoted to a consideration of the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia in order to develop practical measures for stabilizing it.

Kazakhstan views such a meeting not as a single act. It is clear that such a highly complicated problem as Afghanistan cannot be solved by simply holding a meeting, even of such an elevated forum as the United Nations Security Council. We

consider the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan as a preliminary step leading to the beginning of a process in which the international community takes a number of large-scale, comprehensive political, economic and humanitarian measures. In our opinion, such a meeting would enable the countries concerned to take a new look at the Afghan problem, highlight the defects and shortcomings of what has been done by the international community, and also indicate further possibilities for ensuring that the process of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is carried out through peaceful means. It is important for this process to be conducted with the strict and ongoing monitoring of the Security Council. This will be a serious signal for all Afghan groups that the world community, under the auspices of the United Nations, intends to deal comprehensively and in real earnest with the Afghan problem until it is completely solved. This will also demonstrate the firm intention of the community of nations to allocate the necessary economic and financial resources for these purposes.

In our view, good political will on the part of all participants in the peace process is a mandatory requirement for creating a constructive atmosphere at such a meeting. Otherwise, any attempts by the international community to settle the conflict will meet with failure.

2. Kazakhstan considers that the efforts by States must be aimed at instilling in the Afghan people hope that the world community will be able to provide large-scale assistance in restoring the economy of Afghanistan, which has been destroyed by war. It is, therefore, extremely important that the neighbouring countries and interested countries strictly adhere to the principles set forth in the Tashkent Declaration on the results of the meeting of the six-plus-two group, which calls upon the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan that are members of the group to prohibit the transit through their territory of military, technical and material assistance for the warring Afghan groups.

3. Kazakhstan believes that individual measures — either an embargo on the delivery of weapons or sporadic actions to combat drug trafficking — will not have a long-term effect. These measures must become an integral part of a general plan for the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan, which, together with an immediate ceasefire between the warring Afghan groups and the provision of international economic assistance, would include such elements as using the potential of Afghanistan's economic, political and intellectual elite which has emigrated from the country, establishing a system of State administration, reviving the ability of the peoples of Afghanistan to deal with their own problems, and solving the problems related to education, health care and restoring the historical and cultural heritage.

Accordingly, considering that Afghanistan at the current time has become a transitional political entity whose fate practically depends entirely on the correlation of interests and the degree to which foreign political actors are involved in its affairs, Kazakhstan believes that all interested States, including the member countries of the six-plus-two group (China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan plus the United States of America and the Russian Federation), the States members of the European Union (first and foremost, Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy and Sweden), a number of countries from the Asia region (Japan, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and India), the group of Arab States (first of all,

Saudi Arabia and Egypt), other countries from the Central Asian region (including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), the international financial institutions and the United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes (the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and so forth), and also other regional and international organizations, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization for Economic Cooperation, should be actively involved in the peace process.

Furthermore, taking into account the international community's lack of a complete picture as to what is happening in Afghanistan, it is also necessary to use the mechanisms of the Rome, Bonn, Cyprus peace groups and other Afghan public organizations situated abroad in order to unify the database on Afghanistan and have a positive effect on the process of reactivating negotiations between the warring Afghan groups and of establishing a highly responsible Government in the future.

We welcome overall the idea of holding in Afghanistan a meeting of the *Loya Jirga*, the Council of Elders of the Afghan tribes, which in the past played an important role in the life of Afghan society and fulfilled the function of a body that regulated relations between the various tribes of the country. At the same time, this initiative should be developed in isolation from and independent of any narrow political, national or other interests on the part of the States involved in the peace process and interested States.

Obtaining a complete picture and information with regard to Afghanistan and the processes, measures, groups and so forth that are influencing the situation in the country is a most important task. Carrying out this task will enable the world community to work out adequate measures based on the real state of affairs. It is obvious that such a database must be concentrated in the United Nations.

4. Kazakhstan is firmly convinced that all international efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan must be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, which is an impartial mediator in the process of achieving peace and national harmony in Afghanistan. In this connection, Kazakhstan fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Mr. F. Vendrell, and the activities of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan and is ready to continue to provide them with the necessary assistance.

Kazakhstan believes, in this connection, that in order to achieve positive and practical results in resolving the situation in Afghanistan, the activities of the Special Mission and the six-plus-two group must be aimed at addressing the issues relating to openness and a readiness to take the initiative in their work, an adequate assessment of the military and political situation developing in the country, and devising a clear United Nations strategy with respect to the principles, means and forms of the Afghan settlement.

Today's realities require the international community to find new approaches to the assessment of the military and political situation and the geopolitical situation in the Central and South Asian region and develop an essentially new concept of the Afghan settlement, which must reflect the main causes of the conflict in Afghanistan, identify the internal and external forces supporting the warring parties and consider the possible consequences of the confrontation on a regional and international scale. Such a concept must include a programme, forms and

mechanisms for international intervention and the mobilization of financial and material resources.

It must include, if necessary, time limits for conducting peacemaking activities aimed at enforcing peace between the parties and measures for exerting influence on violators of the rules established for the period of the international community's intervention. There can be no doubt that, until such measures are adopted, interested countries must bring strong pressure to bear on the Afghan groups and factions under their control to force them to sit down at the negotiating table without any preconditions.

We are strongly convinced that it must be in the interest of the international community to have at the helm in Afghanistan a multi-ethnic, broadly representative and responsible Government that would fully guarantee internal security and stability, control the processes of the internal reconstruction and development of all spheres of life in Afghanistan and also ensure the conduct of a highly responsible foreign policy within the framework of a civilized dialogue with all countries on the basis of generally recognized international norms.

What Afghanistan will be — an Islamic or a secular State — is, in the final analysis, for Afghans themselves to decide. They must elect a government in the country without intrigues or outside interference. In pursuing such a policy, the international community must not show preference to one or other faction or group in Afghanistan, but instead should create the most favourable possible external conditions for launching a broad and comprehensive national dialogue in Afghanistan on the basis of the clear prospects of an all-round plan for the political, social and economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

5. While it welcomes overall the activities of the Afghanistan sanctions committee, Kazakhstan also supports a carefully thought out approach to the issue of introducing additional measures against the Afghan group known as the Taliban movement. Kazakhstan believes that sanctions, introduced as a necessary measure, must be justified by their ends. Precisely for that reason, the Security Council, before adopting additional measures, must carefully evaluate the impact of the sanctions currently in force on all aspects of resolving the situation in Afghanistan, and, first and foremost, their unintended consequences for the civilian population.

Experience shows that imposing tougher sanctions against the Taliban adversely affects the negotiating process and complicates the prospects for an intra-Afghan dialogue under United Nations auspices.

6. In future, Kazakhstan is ready to officially recognize a Government of Afghanistan that will be capable of truly uniting the Afghan people around it, ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms of all the nationalities in Afghanistan, addressing the country's internal problems responsibly and conducting a peaceful foreign policy.

Kazakhstan has no preconceived attitude towards any group or faction in Afghanistan. The coming to power in Afghanistan of the Taliban or their adversaries will not signify the arrival of the long-awaited peace in that country.

At the present time, however, more than 90 per cent of the country is formally under Taliban control. In this situation, it would be preferable to gradually move away from refusing all contact with them and to establish contacts with the

movement's leaders with a view to the possibility of convincing them to set about forming a responsible Government.

The Taliban's lack of official recognition must not be an obstacle to establishing contacts with the movement, which constitutes a real political force in Afghanistan and an integral or, in any case, a potential element of any future plan for the internal political restructuring of the country. In this context, it makes sense to establish a direct dialogue with the Taliban at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, with mandatory observance of the international sanctions currently in force and the moratorium on official diplomatic recognition, which can be lifted only in exchange for flexibility on the part of Taliban with regard to fulfilling the demands of the international community. As stated above, all factors of political influence must be brought into play to that end, with the involvement of the aforementioned countries and organizations and of Afghan émigrés. The Taliban must see clearly and realize the advantages and prospects of cooperating with the international community and securing from it the necessary guarantees. The establishment of a dialogue precisely on this basis will, in our opinion, help to overcome the deadlock in dealing with the Afghan problem.

7. An analysis of the activities of the world's leading mass media shows that, as a result of the information vacuum that has formed around Afghanistan, the resources of the international community are being spent to address problems in other regions of the world, which are being given priority based on the political and economic interests of the key Powers. Kazakhstan wishes to emphasize, in this connection, the importance of filling this vacuum and actively moving the Afghan problem into the focus of the international community's attention through the world's leading mass media. The presentation of this problem must be balanced and show the unanimous desire of the world community to achieve the earliest possible settlement of the conflict, without a hint of preference for one group or another in Afghanistan. In other words, information on Afghanistan must be as objective as possible. The United Nations Department of Public Information must play its part in this area, as well as the information agencies, by developing an image strategy for drawing the attention of the international community to the problems of Afghanistan and accurate and regular reporting on the events taking place in that country.

8. Kazakhstan, in an expression of its good will, is prepared to assist as a mediator in reactivating the negotiating process. We are ready, in this connection, to organize a round of peace talks between the warring Afghan groups in Almaty. In making this proposal, Kazakhstan is not pursuing any political ambitions, nor has it any intention of competing with other States on this issue.

Kazakhstan does not aspire to leadership in the Afghan peace process and considers that such talks can take place in any State acceptable to the parties to the negotiations. The main criterion must be the agreement of the warring Afghan groups, in principle, to sit down at the negotiating table without preconditions and with a clearly agreed agenda for the talks.

Kazakhstan is also putting forward for discussion the idea of holding a high-level meeting of States and groups with real influence on the situation in Afghanistan for the purpose of discussing the regional situation. We believe that the most important condition for creating a constructive atmosphere of trust at such a meeting has to be an informal and open exchange of views on the whole range of problems relating to Afghanistan, with no rigid agenda and without the adoption of

any final documents or political or other statements on the issues discussed. We are prepared to hold such a meeting in Almaty. The rank of the participants in the meeting could initially be fixed at the level of experts, but only experts who are competent and fully conversant with the situation. In the event of a constructive dialogue, the format and level of meetings could be higher in the future.

The next stage in this regard could be the holding of a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which, as was noted above, would be a preliminary step towards the adoption by the international community of large-scale and comprehensive measures to resolve the situation in Afghanistan and would allow a United Nations concept of this problem to be developed.

It is clear that the holding of meetings at different levels can yield practical results only if there is a constructive atmosphere characterized by a serious attitude towards the Afghan problem and provided that the interested countries, by abandoning their geopolitical ambitions, cease providing military and material assistance to the warring Afghan groups, lay their cards on the table, work out common approaches to resolving the situation in Afghanistan and, as a first step, immediately set about forcing the warring Afghan groups to sit down at the negotiating table without any preconditions.

Notwithstanding that the belligerent parties are counting on settling the conflict by force, which involves their rejection of any peace initiative proposed by the interested States, there is, nevertheless, a need to make use of their dependence on outside sources for their military potential. Otherwise, peace conferences and meetings devoted to considering the situation in Afghanistan will prove to be ineffective and will be incapable of having a positive effect on the process of seeking a peaceful settlement.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

United Nations S/2001/420

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 April 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was distressed to learn of the murder of six staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), four of Congolese nationality and two foreigners, which took place on Thursday, 26 April 2001 in Orientale province, on the Bunia-Djugu road, some 30 kilometres from the town of Bunia, close to the Ugandan border.

On behalf of my Government, I request you to be so kind as to transmit our sincerest condolences to ICRC and to the families of the victims.

According to information in our possession, the cowardly murder of the six ICRC staff was most probably committed by the members of the Ugandan regular army (UPDF) who "discovered" the bodies.

This shocking tragedy took place in a zone that is under the effective control of Uganda, the main agent of arms proliferation in the region, and in which tension is still very high between the Hema and Lendu communities, whose respective militias have been heavily armed by UPDF, which has manipulated them in order to induce them to tear one another apart.

My Government denounces this obstacle put in place by UPDF through its denial of access by humanitarian personnel to the Congolese populations in need of assistance.

My Government calls on the Security Council to hold Uganda primarily responsible for the cowardly murder of the ICRC staff and to require it to provide forthwith all necessary guarantees of the safety, security and freedom of movement of the United Nations and associated humanitarian personnel operating in the occupied provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are under its effective control.

My Government requests the Security Council to call on the Rwandan authorities to secure the dismantling of all the criminal and mafia movements, structures and networks that country has unfortunately organized in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The structures, whose ramifications it has now become apparent, extend up to the most senior UPDF leaders, are pursuing a merciless policy of scorched earth, mass destruction and elimination of all inconvenient

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witnesses. The Council will recall the murder of American tourists about two years ago in circumstances similar to those of the ICRC staff.

My Government wishes once again to emphasize to the Council that one of the prerequisites for the restoration of lasting peace in my country is necessarily the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Ugandan forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with all the relevant resolutions of the Council on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government requests you to have this circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Ileka**
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2001/421

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 24 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to the statement made in the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms, appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), concerning the presence of Libyan nationals in Liberia for the purpose of training non-Liberian nationals for deployment in territory controlled by the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195 [, para. 184]).

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya denies that any Libyan nationals are present in Liberia for the purpose of training any of the elements there, and it affirms that the statement made in the report is totally inconsistent with the efforts the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is making to bring peace to West Africa in particular and to the African continent in general.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stands ready, at all times and in all forums, to strive for peaceful solutions to disputes and conflicts among its African brothers, to unite their efforts to solve the problems confronting the continent and to utilize all of its capacities in the service of Africa's peoples. The allegations made in the report in question thus have no explanation other than that they are intended to disparage the positive role Libya is playing in the African arena, which is one that seeks to achieve stability and promote development in all parts of the African continent.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abuzed Omar **Dorda**
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2001/422

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 26 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that item 37, "The situation relating to Nagorny Karabakh", contained in paragraph 10 of the summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration (S/2001/15), be retained on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Eldar **Kouliev**
Permanent Representative

01-35373 (E) 270401

United Nations S/2001/423

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001

Original: English

Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Introduction

1. By its resolution 1337 (2001) of 30 January 2001, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months and decided to return its military personnel to the level of about 4,500 all ranks. The necessary measures have been taken to implement this reduction, which will be completed by 31 July 2001.

2. In paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Security Council endorsed the general approach for the reconfiguration of UNIFIL, as outlined in paragraph 23 of my report of 22 January 2001 (S/2001/66), and requested me to submit to it by 30 April 2001 a detailed report on the plans for the reconfiguration and on the tasks that could be carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This report is submitted pursuant to that request.

Recent developments

3. Since that resolution was adopted, the situation has remained essentially unchanged, although there were further developments in the dispute over the Shab'a farms area. As before, there were frequent minor ground violations of the Blue Line. There were, in addition, almost daily violations of the line by Israeli aircraft which penetrated deeply into Lebanese airspace. I have been in touch with the parties concerned and other interested parties to urge respect for the Blue Line and to avert further escalation.

4. Serious breaches occurred relating to the Shab'a farms dispute. On 16 February, Hizballah killed one Israeli soldier and wounded two others by means of a bomb placed in the Shab'a farms area, on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. The Israeli forces retaliated with heavy mortar and artillery fire into the vicinity of Kafr Shuba. On 14 April, Hizballah struck an Israeli tank with a missile approximately three kilometres from the Blue Line on the Israeli side, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding three others. The Israeli forces initially responded with heavy artillery fire into Lebanon, and on 16 April they carried out an air attack against a Syrian radar position about 45 kilometres east of Beirut. The Syrian authorities reported one soldier killed and four wounded. These incidents are a matter of serious concern as they have the potential to further exacerbate tension.

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5. Despite the Security Council's call in paragraph 7 of resolution 1337 (2001), Lebanon continues to assert that the Blue Line is not valid in the Shab'a farms area. With reference to paragraph 5 of resolution 1337 (2001), the presence of the Lebanese authorities in the south, including the armed forces, has remained basically the same as described in paragraph 7 of my last report.

Reconfiguration plan

6. In my last report, I noted that UNIFIL had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security. Pending a comprehensive p ce, UNIFIL seeks to maintain the ceasefire along the Blue Line through patrols, observation from fixed positions and close contact with the parties, the latter with a view to correcting violations and preventing escalation. Although these are the functions of an observer mission, I recommended that, in view of the conditions in the region, they be carried out by a combination of armed infantry and unarmed observers.

7. The focus of UNIFIL will be, as it is now, on the Blue Line and the adjacent area. In connection with the reconfiguration, it is envisaged that the area will be divided into two sectors. The bulk of the troops will be deployed in protected positions close to the Blue Line. There will be fewer fixed positions than at present to avoid too many personnel being absorbed by guard and maintenance duties. The Force will be present on the Blue Line primarily through its patrols. The Force headquarters will remain at Naqoura, protected by a separate guard, as at present. UNIFIL will continue to require full freedom of movement to meet its operational, administrative and logistic requirements.

8. The unarmed military observers of UNTSO will be entirely mobile and will no longer maintain static observation posts. This will enable them to undertake daytime patrolling, carry out investigations and perform liaison functions. The current strength of Observer Group Lebanon (51) is deemed sufficient for these tasks. For reasons of security and economy the observers will be accommodated alongside the infantry.

9. It is envisaged that the demining unit will be maintained, since mines will remain a serious hazard for the Force for the time being. In conformity with paragraph 10 of resolution 1337 (2001), UNIFIL has supported mine action activities related to assisting the efforts of the Government of Lebanon. My Personal Representative, Staffan de Mistura, has been very active generating support for mine clearing and ensuring effective coordination between the Lebanese authorities and United Nations agencies. An ad hoc high-level workshop on mine clearing will be held in Beirut on 21 May. The pledge by the Government of the United Arab Emirates to contribute $50 million towards demining activities in the south is greatly appreciated.

10. The other support elements will be reduced in accordance with the overall reduction. When the reconfiguration is complete, the Force will comprise troops from France (headquarters guard), Ghana (infantry), India (infantry), Italy (helicopters), Poland (logistics) and Ukraine (engineers/demining). Its overall strength would then be close to 2,000 all ranks.

Conclusion

11. It is envisaged that the reconfiguration of the Force will be achieved through the non-replacement or reduction of units on the occasion of their normal rotations. The Government of Ireland has already said that it will not replace its contingent when it rotates in October/November. The Finnish contingent will be reduced by 350 troops by the end of July, and it is my intention not to request a replacement for the remaining Finnish troops when they are repatriated in October. The departure of these two contingents will bring the strength of the Force to about 3,600. I recommend that the Force maintain that level until January 2002. Unless there is any drastic change in the region, the reconfiguration could be completed during the following mandate period, ending in July 2002.

United Nations S/2001/424

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001

Original: English

First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) regarding Liberia

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 12 of its resolution 1343 (2001) of 7 March 2001, the Security Council requested me to submit to it a first report by 30 April 2001 and to report thereafter at six-month intervals from that date, drawing on information from all relevant sources, including the United Nations Office in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on whether Liberia has complied with the demands in paragraph 2 of that resolution. I was also requested to report on any progress made towards the objectives set out in paragraph 3 of the resolution.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. It contains information regarding the measures taken by the Government of Liberia in response to the recommendations contained in the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1306 (2000) and in compliance with resolution 1343 (2001), since its adoption on 7 March 2001.

II. Measures adopted by the Government of Liberia prior to resolution 1343 (2001)

3. Following the publication of the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1306 (2000), the Government of Liberia announced a number of measures in response to that report. In resolution 1343 (2001), the Security Council took note of those measures and welcomed the intention of ECOWAS to monitor their implementation, in close cooperation with the United Nations.

4. The measures that the Council took note of in resolution 1343 (2001) are the ones announced by the Government of Liberia on 12 January 2001. They include:

(a) The adoption of a new policy of disengagement by which the Government would no longer support the activities of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). It called on RUF to lay down its arms.

(b) The grounding of all aircraft registered under the Liberian flag until their owners produced documentary proof of their airworthiness under Liberia's civil aviation laws and standards based on those of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

(c) All persons connected with RUF were ordered to depart from Liberia.

5. On 7 February 2001, the Government of Liberia announced the departure from Liberia of Sam Bockarie, alias "Maskita" and the closure of the RUF liaison office in Liberia.

6. On 6 March, the Government of Liberia established an eight-person Presidential Task Force on Sanctions, jointly chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the National Security Adviser, to oversee the Government's compliance with the demands of the international community, as specified in the report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000), and in anticipation of the adoption of resolution 1343 (2001).

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III. Reports of the United Nations Office in Liberia, UNAMSIL and ECOWAS regarding Liberia's compliance with resolution 1343 (2001)

A. Information from the United Nations Office in Liberia

7. Since the adoption of resolution 1343 (2001), the United Nations Office in Liberia has to the best of its ability collected and relayed information on the measures which the Government of Liberia claims to have taken in compliance with paragraphs 2 (a) to (e) of the resolution. It must be stressed that the Office does not have the capacity to provide independent confirmation of the claims by the Government of Liberia. A number of documents were provided to the Office by the Government of Liberia as corroborating evidence of its compliance with the resolution. These documents, a list of which is annexed to this report, are available at the Secretariat. Much of the information provided in paragraph 4 above and the following paragraphs can also be found in the letter dated 21 March 2001 from President Taylor addressed to the Secretary-General and forwarded to the Security Council (S/2001/264).

Paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 1343 (2001): expulsion of all RUF members from Liberia, and prohibition of all RUF activities on its territory

8. The Government of Liberia contends that all members of RUF have left the territory of Liberia in compliance with the Government's 72-hour departure order. The RUF contact office in Monrovia has been closed down and all RUF activities have been banned in Liberia. The departure order preceded the adoption of resolution 1343 (2001).

Paragraph 2 (b): cessation of all financial and military support to RUF, including all transfers of arms and ammunition, all military training and the provision of logistical and communications support, and taking steps to ensure that no such support is provided from the territory of Liberia or by its nationals

9. The Government of Liberia stated that, by an order dated 19 March 2001, it had closed the Liberia/Sierra Leone border, and had requested the United Nations and ECOWAS to deploy observers and monitors at the Roberts International Airport and all other ports of entry, so as to confirm that there was no support to RUF from the territory of Liberia, or by its nationals. The Government of Liberia had also issued directives for the proper monitoring of the border by Liberian joint security forces to ensure the efficacy of the border closure.

Paragraph 2 (c): cessation of all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra Leone

10. The United Nations Office in Liberia was informed that, on 16 March 2001, a ban had been placed on the entry of all uncertified rough diamonds from countries with existing certification regimes. On 19 March 2001, the Government of Liberia unilaterally closed its border with Sierra Leone and announced that it had since arrested seven diamond smugglers. The export of Liberia's own rough diamonds was also banned for a period of 120 days, pending the establishment of an internationally acceptable certification regime in Liberia. The Government contends that the second measure goes beyond the demands of the Security Council. On 21 March 2001, President Taylor wrote to the Secretary-General (S/2001/264) requesting the assistance of the United Nations. The Government of Liberia has also requested technical assistance from the High Diamond Council.

Paragraph 2 (d): freezing of funds or financial resources or assets that are made available by nationals of Liberia or within its territory directly or indirectly for the benefit of RUF or entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by RUF

11. The Government of Liberia stated that it had taken the following measures: (a) a Court Order was obtained to allow commercial banks operating in Liberia to disclose information to the Central Bank of Liberia on all financial assets and accounts that may be held by RUF or any of its members named in annex 3 to the report of the Panel of Experts; (b) the Central Bank of Liberia requested all commercial banks operating in Liberia to provide detailed reports on any accounts or financial assets held by the RUF members named in the Court Order, or individuals connected with them. In this connection, the Government reported

late in March that a savings account operated by Foday Sankoh, containing US$ 500, had been frozen.

Paragraph 2 (e): grounding of all Liberia-registered aircraft operating within Liberia's jurisdiction until it updates its register of aircraft pursuant to annex VII to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and provides to the Council the updated information concerning the registration and ownership of each aircraft registered in Liberia

12. The Government of Liberia stated that it had grounded all Liberia-registered aircraft and revoked their licences. On 22 January 2001, the Minister of Transport issued a notice to ICAO and to States members of ICAO and aircraft operators grounding all aircraft on the Liberian registry and revoking the appointment of all agents acting on behalf of the Government of Liberia in matters related to aircraft inspection and registration. On 6 March 2001, the Government of Liberia revoked the registration of all aircraft under the Liberian Civil Aircraft registry. On the same day, the Government of Liberia dismissed its Director of Civil Aviation who had unilaterally lifted the order grounding two Liberian-registered aircraft in Rwanda and Luxembourg. By a letter dated 13 March 2001, the Liberian Director of Civil Aviation requested all ICAO authorities to serve notice of the grounding and revocation order on all Liberia-registered aircraft within their territory and under their authority.

13. The Government of Liberia also dispatched its Minister of Transport and Director of Civil Aviation to ICAO headquarters to brief the international authorities on actions taken as well as to request their cooperation and assistance in reforming Liberia's civil aviation administration. On 24 March, the Director of Civil Aviation of Liberia requested all civil aviation authorities worldwide to provide him with information on steps taken by them in compliance with the grounding order issued by the Government of Liberia on 22 January and the revocation of Liberian-registered aircrafts' licences effected on 6 March. The Ministry of Transport dispatched de-registration certificates to all operators of the affected aircraft.

14. The United Nations Office in Liberia has stated that it lacked the means, and was not in a position, to provide any authoritative information on the Government of Liberia's compliance with the demands listed in paragraphs 3 (a) to (d) of resolution 1343 (2001), which deal essentially with the situation inside Sierra Leone.

B. Report of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

15. In providing the information cited below, UNAMSIL stated that it was unable to confirm Liberia's compliance with the demands set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001). However, with regard to paragraph 2 (a), UNAMSIL observed that, on 12 January 2001, the Government of Liberia issued a statement in which it renounced all support for RUF and called on RUF to lay down its arms. In what it called a new policy of "disengagement", the Government of Liberia also announced the expulsion of the former RUF field commander, Sam Bockarie, and all persons associated with RUF from Liberia. Shortly after that, the Government of Sierra Leone sent a letter to President Taylor requesting the extradition of Bockarie and other RUF cadres. Leaders from some ECOWAS countries also asked President Taylor to hand over Bockarie to an ECOWAS country for "safekeeping".

16. The Government of Liberia, however, announced on 7 February that Bockarie had left Liberia and that the RUF liaison office in Monrovia had been closed. Bockarie's destination was not disclosed and his whereabouts are still not known. Leaders from ECOWAS countries have informed the head of UNAMSIL, Oluyemi Adeniji, that President Taylor also claimed not to know the whereabouts of Bockarie and of others "expelled" from Liberia. During a meeting with the RUF interim leader, Issa Sesay, in Kailahun on 16 March, the Force Commander asked him about unconfirmed reports of Bockarie's presence in RUF-held Sierra Leonean territory. Sesay denied the reports and stated that Bockarie had been expelled from RUF and would be arrested if he showed up in any RUF-held area.

17. UNAMSIL was informed by RUF-affiliated sources, however, that the Government of Liberia continued to maintain relations with RUF.

18. With regard to paragraph 3 (a) of the resolution dealing with free access for UNAMSIL throughout Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL reported that it has been able to deploy to some RUF-held areas, including Lunsar and Mange, and that it was preparing to deploy to

Makeni and Magburaka. The deployment accomplished so far has not encountered any obstruction from RUF. UNAMSIL has also freely carried out patrols to other RUF-held areas, including Kailahun and Kambia districts.

19. On several occasions, however, RUF ground commanders in the east have obstructed some patrols, insisting that they required prior approval from the RUF high command. On one occasion, RUF prevented a UNAMSIL patrol from spending the night in Magburaka, saying that prior notification was needed for the patrol to stay overnight. These incidents have been raised with the RUF leadership, who promised to issue the necessary orders to their ground commanders to allow UNAMSIL patrols free access. Subsequently, UNAMSIL reported that RUF had removed checkpoints between Rogberi Junction and Lunsar and had even allowed UNAMSIL troops to stay overnight in Makeni and Magburaka. In the view of UNAMSIL, the fact that UNAMSIL troops were allowed to stay overnight in Makeni and Magburaka marked a positive development since it enabled UNAMSIL to deploy to those two towns on 24 April. UNAMSIL further reported that, in Lunsar, RUF was cooperating with respect to possibilities of establishing a camp for internally displaced persons.

20. With respect to paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution, dealing with the release of all abducted persons, RUF has not released any abducted civilians since the resolution was adopted. On 9 April, RUF Colonel Kallon informed participants at the Lunsar Regional Contact Group meeting that they had compiled and submitted to Caritas (an international non-governmental organization) a list containing the names of 200 child combatants who were to be released. On 21 April, however, an RUF commander informed the Nigerian battalion that the child combatants would not be released until orders were received from the RUF high command.

21. Regarding paragraph 3 (c) on the entering of RUF fighters in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, UNAMSIL has reported that RUF has yet to join the programme as an organization. It has maintained that it will start disarming its combatants only if the Sierra Leone army and the Civil Defence Force simultaneously do the same. However, disgruntled individual RUF combatants have secretly continued to go forward to disarm, but in small numbers.

22. Under paragraph 3 (d), regarding the return of weapons and other equipment seized from UNAMSIL, it is reported that, to date, RUF has returned to UNAMSIL only 56 personal weapons, 10 vehicles, and 20 armoured personnel carriers. The returned vehicles and armoured personnel carriers were completely stripped of their weapons and are not in a usable condition. The RUF leader has indicated that the 15 remaining armoured personnel carriers have been assembled at Lunsar and Kailahun for collection by UNAMSIL.

C. Report of the Economic Community of West African States

23. Following the Summit held at Abuja on 11 April, ECOWAS established a mission of its Mediation and Security Council, comprising Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Togo and the ECOWAS secretariat, to verify Liberia's compliance with the demands set out in resolution 1343 (2001).

24. During its stay in Liberia, from 19 to 24 April, the Mission met with government officials, leading members of civil society, including a Muslim community leader, a church leader, a leader of the women's associations, representatives of opposition political parties, some diplomats, officials of the United Nations residing in Monrovia, representatives of the Liberia Press Union and representatives of the local and international media.

25. The Mission visited Springfield airport to inspect grounded Liberian-registered aircraft and also visited the military training camp at Gbatala, outside Monrovia, to ascertain the truth about the lingering suspicion of the presence of foreign nationals receiving military training therein.

26. With respect to paragraphs 2 (a) to (e), the ECOWAS Mission was provided by the Government of Liberia with the same information and supporting documents it had conveyed to the United Nations Office in Liberia, which are discussed in section III.A above. Therefore, this section will reproduce only the information the ECOWAS team was able to gather from non-governmental and other sources. The observations, conclusions and recommendations of the ECOWAS team are also reproduced below.

Paragraph 2 (a): expulsion of all RUF members from Liberia

Information from other sources

27. Most of the people interviewed had doubts about the effectiveness of the RUF expulsion order. They stated that, on 5 February 2001, the Government had announced the immediate expulsion of RUF members. This turned out to be ineffective, as known RUF members, including General Sam Bockarie (Mosquito), were openly seen in the streets of Monrovia. However, sustained public pressure on the Government led to their eventual departure from Monrovia. A source said that the Government had detected the apparent presence of Sam Bockarie in Liberia. The RUF office in Monrovia, which the Government said it had closed down, could not be identified. Information was, however, available on the former places of abode in Monrovia of Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie.

Observation of the Mission

28. The Government of Liberia was either reluctant or unable to tell the Mission how the RUF members had left Liberian territory, or at which border crossing points, or to provide documentation on their exit, their destination and whether some RUF members had been integrated into Liberian security forces. That situation would appear to underscore the lingering suspicion expressed by some of the interviewed sources that some RUF fighters might have simply been relocated to other parts of Liberia. Consequently, the Mission found it difficult to discount the speculation that some RUF members are still in Liberia.

29. The Mission considers that the United Nations should be urged to accept the request of the Government of Liberia to deploy UNAMSIL monitors and observers on Liberia's side of the border with Sierra Leone, and at all points of entry into Liberia.

Paragraph 2 (b): cessation of all financial and military support to RUF

Information from other sources

30. The sources interviewed mentioned that there was no way for local non-official sources to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of the Government's claims that it had met this demand. They were suspicious of two military training camps, one at Gbatala and the other at Nama, where members of the Anti-Terrorist Unit are trained, and held the view that the nationalities of the trainees could not be determined. It was a generally held belief that the inconclusive implementation of the Abuja Accord on the Liberian peace process had prevented the restructuring of the armed forces of Liberia and given rise to the proliferation of armed security outfits.

Observation of the Mission

31. The Mission could not verify Liberia's non-compliance with this demand of the Security Council. The members of the Mission who visited Gbatala training camp could not confirm, for instance, the training of foreign nationals there because the trainees had been sent to contain the incursions in Lofa County. It suggested that, for proper verification of arms transfers across Liberia's borders, the international community should urgently accept the Government's request for neutral monitors to be placed at Liberia's borders, and at its points of entry.

Paragraph 2 (c): cessation of all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds

Information from other sources

32. The sources which were contacted could not offer any relevant information on this item.

Observation of the Mission

33. Verification of the efficacy of the banning of rough uncertified diamonds into Liberia and the 120-day suspension/banning order on the exportation of diamonds from Liberia is difficult, given the nature of the diamond trade and the high incidence of smuggling. From the documents given to the Mission by the Government of Liberia, it appeared that the government had taken more action than demanded by the Security Council in resolution 1343 (2001). Since diamonds can neither be imported into nor exported from Liberia now, it is unlikely that the smuggling of diamonds into Liberia will remain high, as profitability will plummet. Liberia's efforts to institute its own certification of origin regime is commendable and the United Nations should help the Government to achieve it objective.

Paragraph 2 (d): freezing of funds or financial resources or assets that benefit RUF ...

Information from other sources

34. The sources that were interviewed by the Mission stated that interested individual and corporate bodies could not have access to requested information because of banking regulations. Doubt was however expressed about the approximately $500 mentioned in Foday Sankoh's account since one newspaper had earlier reported that $500,000 had been found in that account. They found it difficult to believe that, of all the RUF members, only Foday Sankoh had a bank account in Liberia.

Observation of the Mission

35. The Mission visited the Central Bank of Liberia to verify if the freezing order was actually communicated to the commercial banks and acknowledged that this had been done. The Mission examined the outgoing and incoming correspondence registers to ascertain the mail transactions. The attached documents show the movement of correspondence between the Central Bank and commercial banks. The Mission therefore acknowledged the measures taken by the Government of Liberia to comply with the demand of the Security Council in respect of assets of RUF members.

Paragraph 2 (e): grounding of all Liberia-registered aircraft operating within Liberia's jurisdiction ...

Information from other sources

36. The sources contacted were not of much help to the Mission.

Observation of the Mission

37. The Mission visited the Ministry of Transport and also the Civil Aviation Authority on 23 April 2001 to examine their documents. Four grounded aircraft listed in documents were shown to the team at Springfield airport in Monrovia. The Mission was also informed that there were seven aircraft grounded outside Liberia's borders. The Mission was of the view that the Government of Liberia seemed serious in meeting the demands of the Security Council in resolution 1343 (2001) in respect of the grounding of aircraft.

Conclusions of the ECOWAS Mission

38. The conclusions of the ECOWAS Mission members are the following:

- They express their appreciation for being given the important task of verifying Liberian compliance with resolution 1343 (2001);
- They appreciate the frankness and willingness of the officials of the Government of Liberia and independent sources to cooperate with members of the Mission;
- They express dismay over the untidy handling of the expulsion of members of RUF, and in particular Sam Bockarie, whose whereabouts continued to generate controversy;
- They find it contradictory for the United Nations to demand that Liberia should expel RUF from Liberian territory on the one hand, while it wants Liberia to influence RUF cooperation with UNAMSIL on the other hand;
- They commend the undertakings given by Liberia to ensure verification of its actions and request the United Nations to deploy observers to monitor the borders and other entry points like airports and seaports in Liberia;
- They believe that, in line with due process, the Government of Liberia should be confronted with evidence of its wrongdoings to underline the spirit of fairness and transparency.

Recommendations of the ECOWAS Mission

39. The Mission recommends that:

- The Government of Liberia should account for the whereabouts of Sam Bockarie;
- The United Nations should provide evidence of Liberia's wrongdoings;
- The United Nations should deploy monitors/observers to the Liberian borders with Sierra Leone and to other entry points.

IV. Observations

40. I have provided in the preceding paragraphs the pertinent information that was made available to the Secretariat through the United Nations Office in

Liberia and UNAMSIL and by ECOWAS, on the extent of Liberia's compliance with the demands set out in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). In the absence of an independent verification mechanism, it is difficult to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of that information. In this connection, I am grateful to ECOWAS which, despite severe time, logistical and resource constraints, dispatched a mission of its Mediation and Security Council to Liberia and provided me with additional information from sources independent of the Government of Liberia.

41. I share the dismay expressed by the ECOWAS Mission regarding the untidy manner in which the Government handled the expulsion of RUF members, in particular Sam Bockarie. Unverified information reaching the Secretariat indicate that Bockarie is still living in Liberia and that the Government of Liberia has not severed it relations with RUF in Sierra Leone. This information seems to corroborate UNAMSIL's observation in paragraph 17 above.

42. The Security Council may wish to examine the observation of the ECOWAS Mission that the United Nations cannot demand that the Government of Liberia expel RUF from its territory and at the same time request it to influence RUF to cooperate with UNAMSIL. Several regional leaders referred pointedly to this apparent contradiction in their discussions with the United Nations inter-agency mission during its recent visit to West Africa.

43. Both in its conclusions and in its recommendations, the ECOWAS Mission has drawn attention to the need for the United Nations to deploy observers to the Liberian border with Sierra Leone and other entry points. The Security Council may recall that President Taylor, in his letter of 21 March 2001 (S/2001/264), had made the same request. The United Nations inter-agency mission to West Africa also recommended the expansion of UNAMSIL's mandate to cover the three Mano River Union countries, given the interrelations between the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777), the implementation of United Nations sanctions against Liberia and the monitoring of the borders between the three countries.

44. It is the prerogative of the Security Council to draw the appropriate conclusions from the information provided in this report and from information made available to it from other sources. Whatever decision the Council may take as a follow-up to resolution 1343 (2001), I strongly suggest that the international community remain engaged with Liberia and its people. External pressure without dialogue may not have a lasting impact on a country that is battling its own armed insurgency and is mired in deep political, economic and social problems.

45. Finally, it is imperative that the Security Council continue to work with ECOWAS and, particularly, with its Mediation and Security Council, in order to avoid a rift that could be exploited by the enemies of peace in a region that has seen more than its share of strife and human suffering.

Annex

Documents provided by the Government of Liberia

1. Voluntary departure order issued by the Minister of Justice on 5 February 2001.

2. Border closure order issued by the Minister of Justice on 19 March 2001.

3. Press release on the exportation ban or uncertified rough diamonds issued by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy.

4A. Ban on the entry into Liberia of all uncertified rough diamonds issued by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy on 16 March 2001.

4B. Letter dated 16 March 2001 from the Minister of Justice to the Minister of Finance, requesting enforcement of and compliance with the ban on the importation of uncertified rough diamonds.

4C. Letter dated 21 March 2001 from the Deputy Minister of Finance to the Minister of Justice, accompanied by a circular to all Collectors of Customs instructing full compliance with the importation ban.

5. Letter dated 9 April 2001 from the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Liberia to the Director of International Affairs of the High Diamond Council regarding the establishment of a diamond certification regime.

6. Letter dated 16 March 2001 from the Adler Diamond Trading Company of Belgium, presenting its candidature for the establishment of an international control system for the export of diamonds from Liberia.

6A. Letter dated 16 March 2001 from the Acting Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy to the Chairman of the World Diamond Council on the 120-day exportation ban.

7. Letter dated 20 March 2001 from the Minister of Justice to the Governor of the Central Bank of Liberia, conveying an application for a Court Order.

7A. Application for a Court Order, dated 16 March 2001, directing commercial banks to disclose information and freeze accounts registered in the name of RUF.

7B. Court Order issued on 20 March 2001 by the Civil Law Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County.

8. Letter dated 11 April 2001 from the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, conveying a statement of account in favour of Foday Sankoh.

8A. Liberian Bank for Development and Investment statement of account in favour of Foday Sankoh.

8B. Letter dated 2 April 2001 from the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment providing balance of account in favour of Foday Sankoh.

8C. Liberian Bank for Development and Investment detail account inquiry statement for account of Foday Sankoh.

9. Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Liberia to the Minister of Justice confirming the non-existence of accounts in favour of RUF in commercial banks operating in Liberia (with the exception of Foday Sankoh's account with the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment.

9A. Letter dated 27 March 2001 from ECOBANK to the Governor of the Central Bank, indicating non-existence of accounts in favour of RUF or its members.

9B. Letter dated 22 March 2001 from the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, confirming existence of an account in the name of Foday Sankoh.

9C. Letter dated 26 March 2001 from TRADEVCO Bank to the Governor of the Central Bank, indicating non-existence of accounts in favour of RUF or its members.

9D. Letter dated 22 March 2001 from the International Bank (Liberia) Limited to the Governor of Central Bank, confirming non-existence of accounts in favour of RUF or its members.

10. Letter dated 22 March 2001 from the Minister of Commerce to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, confirming non-existence of businesses in Liberia registered under the name of RUF or its members.

11. Ministry of Transport press release dated 6 March 2001, revoking the registration of all aircraft under the Liberian Civil Aircraft Registry.

12. Ministry of Information Press Release dated 6 March 2001, advising of the dismissal of the Director of Civil Aviation.

13. Ministry of Transport press release dated 22 January 2001, grounding all aircraft registered under the Liberian flag and revoking the appointments of all agents acting on behalf of the Government of Liberia.

14. Letter dated 13 March 2001 from the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority to all civil aviation authorities on the revocation of the registration of Liberian-registered aircraft.

15. Civil Aviation Directorate list dated 16 March 2001 of all aircraft on the Liberian Registry.

16. Response dated 12 March 2001 from ICAO to the Minister of Transport, regarding correspondence from the Civil Aviation Authority on the revocation of the registration of aircraft under the Liberian Civil Aircraft Registry.

17. Letter dated 30 March 2001 from the Director of the Civil Aviation Authority to the Minister of Transport, indicating that the ICAO Regional Office in Dakar had transmitted the revocation of registration certificates of all aircraft under the Liberian registry worldwide.

18. Report of the Minister of Transport dated 29 March 2001 on his visit to ICAO headquarters.

19. Circular letter dated 24 March 2001 from the Director of Civil Aviation to all Civil Aviation Authorities requesting information on action taken in compliance with the grounding order.

20. General notification of aircraft de-registration issued on 12 April 2001 by the Ministry of Transport.

21. Letter dated 29 March 2001 from the Director of Civil Aviation of Namibia, promising cooperation in enforcing the grounding order.

22. Ministry of Transport aircraft de-registration certificates.

United Nations S/2001/425

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001
English
Original: Spanish

Letter dated 26 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to write to you with reference to document S/2001/15 of 19 March 2001, which contains the summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration.

In accordance with the procedure established by the note by the President of the Security Council dated 29 August 1996 (S/1996/704), I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Cuba wishes all the items submitted for the Council's consideration by the Republic of Cuba, as they appear in document S/2001/15, to remain on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bruno **Rodríguez Parrilla**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-35513 (E) 010501 010501

United Nations A/55/920-S/2001/426

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001
English
Original: French

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 23 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement on the escalation of violence in the Middle East issued on 18 April 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Pierre **Schori**
Permanent Representative of Sweden
to the United Nations

01-35464 (E) 300401 300401

Annex to the letter dated 23 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the escalation of violence in the Middle East issued on 18 April 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union

The European Union is extremely concerned about the dangerous escalation of violence in the Middle East. The Israeli attack on Syrian objectives in Lebanon, the first in many years, as a retaliation for the Hizbollah attacks on the Shebaa farms, was an excessive and disproportionate reply. Furthermore, the excessive use of the army and the disproportionate Israeli reply to mortar attacks from Palestinian administered territories on Israeli targets further escalate violence and aggravate the conflict. Israeli incursions into Palestinian controlled territories are illegal and must not be repeated.

The spiral of violence must be reversed. The price to be paid by the peoples of the region could be high. The European Union urges all parties to act with maximum restraint, restore calm and do their utmost to prevent actions that may claim new victims.

The European Union remains convinced that there is no alternative to a negotiated solution based on international law, in particular, Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and the principle of land for peace. The Union encourages both parties to engage in serious attempts to find a negotiated solution at this critical juncture and welcomes efforts that are made to this effect such as the Egyptian-Jordanian initiative.

United Nations A/55/922–S/2001/427

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 64 and 114

Question of Cyprus

Human rights questions

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 27 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 27 April 2001, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 64 and 114, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Umit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-35508 (E) 030501

Annex to the letter dated 27 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to refer to the letter dated 10 April 2001 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/55/895-S/2001/345), enclosing the text of a European Parliament resolution concerning Panicos Tsiakourmas, who was arrested on 13 December 2000 within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for possession of drugs.

In connection with the above-mentioned unfortunate and misguided resolution, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the letter dated 16 April 2001 addressed to the President of the European Parliament by His Excellency Mr. Ertuğrul Hasipoğlu, President of the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see enclosure I), as well as the text of a statement issued on 7 April 2001 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same subject (see enclosure II).

As you may already know, after the completion of the judicial process initiated by the independent judiciary of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Gazi Mağusa District Court, on 26 April 2001, sentenced Panicos Tsiakourmas to six months in jail. Subsequently, the Court ordered his immediate release based on time already served and good conduct.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure I

Letter dated 16 April 2001 from the President of the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to the President of the European Parliament

I have the honour to refer to the resolution entitled "Abduction of Mr. Tsiakourmas in Cyprus", recently adopted by the European Parliament, and to bring to your kind attention the following.

The said resolution, largely tabled by Greek members, reflects wholly the Greek Cypriot viewpoint, casting aside all the facts and legal aspects of the Tsiakourmas case and the rule of law in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and as such it is irrelevant to the case in question and harmful to efforts to bring about reconciliation on the island.

With this resolution, the European Parliament has not only made baseless allegations concerning the situation in Cyprus but has also arrogated to itself the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the TRNC and in the independent judicial process concerning a serious offence, such as drug smuggling, which has already been referred to the due process of law.

I wish to stress that there is no "occupation" in Cyprus, as alleged in the resolution, but a lawful presence based on international treaties. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus was undertaken in accordance with her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and Turkish forces are in Cyprus with the full consent of the Turkish Cypriot people, who by exercising their inherent right to self-determination established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in November 1983, 20 years after having been left stateless by the Greek Cypriots. It should be understood that the presence of Turkish forces in Northern Cyprus, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive agreement, is a vital security requirement for the Turkish Cypriot people because it serves as a deterrent against the repetition of Greek-Greek Cypriot aggression.

It hardly needs to be stressed that the TRNC is not a "local administration in the occupied area of Cyprus", as claimed in the aforementioned resolution. There is no question of Turkey exercising jurisdiction in the TRNC, which has its own democratically elected government, exercising full and exclusive authority and jurisdiction over the territory and people of the State. Turkey, therefore, cannot be held accountable for the policies and/or actions of the legitimate authorities of the TRNC. Rather than questioning the legitimacy of the TRNC, the European Parliament would better serve prospects for reconciliation in Cyprus by questioning the myth that the Greek Cypriot administration in Southern Cyprus, which in 1963 forcibly usurped the seat of government of the binational partnership Republic of 1960, is the "legitimate Government of Cyprus".

I would like to emphasize that Mr. Panicos Tsiakourmas was not abducted but lawfully arrested by the TRNC authorities. On 12 December 2000, Mr. Tsiakourmas was arrested by the Narcotics Department of the Turkish Cypriot police near the village of Beyarmudu in TRNC territory on suspicion of dealing in narcotics. More than one kilogram of narcotics was found in his possession and on the same day Mr. Tsiakourmas was brought before the Lefkoşa District Court, which ordered his

detention. United Nations officials in Cyprus were duly informed about the incident and the detainee was examined by a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) doctor, who found his condition fully satisfactory. Mr. Tsiakourmas continues to be under the care and supervision of a Turkish Cypriot specialist, Dr. Hasan Sav, and is visited regularly by a UNFICYP physical, as well as a family doctor.

In accordance with legal procedure, Mr. Tsiakourmas was detained at the Lefkoşa Central Prison until his preliminary inquiry began at the Gazi Mağusa District Court, on 8 February 2001. On 15 February, the court committed the case to the Assize Court and his case came before the Gazi Mağusa Assize Court on 21 February, where it is currently continuing.

Mr. Tsiakourmas has been and is being treated with full care and respect for the due process of law. He has retained a team of lawyers, including a Turkish Cypriot lawyer, Mr. Menteş Aziz, who have full access to him, and Mr. Tsiakourmas benefits from all his legal rights, including full medical care and visits by his family. Greek Cypriot allegations aiming at politicizing this case, which is still under trial, are unfounded and constitute an unwarranted interference in the due process of law in a democratic country with an independent judiciary. For your information, these facts are confirmed, among others, in annual reports of the United States Department of State on human rights practices in Cyprus, which most currently (2000) states that "democratic principles are generally respected" and that "the judiciary is independent of executive and military influence" in Northern Cyprus.

I would be most grateful if this letter were to be circulated among the distinguished Members of the European Parliament.

(*Signed*) Dr. Ertuğrul **Hasipoğlu**
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly

Enclosure II

Statement issued on 7 April 2001 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

The resolution adopted by the European Parliament upon the instigation of Greek Parliamentarians in connection with Panicos Tsiakourmas, who was arrested within the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) territory for possessing drugs, has been received with regret and has aroused indignation among our people. With this resolution, the European Parliament has arrogated to itself the right to interfere in our internal affairs and our independent judicial process in a case which entails a serious offence, such as drug trafficking, and which has already been referred to court, and has made baseless allegations with regard to the TRNC and Turkey as well as the Cyprus dispute.

TRNC authorities have, from the beginning, respected the legal rights of Mr. Tsiakourmas, who was arrested on 13 December 2000 within TRNC territory for possession of drugs; have provided him with every facility to defend his legal rights; and during this process have also shown the necessary care for his health condition. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is also well aware of these realities and is in a position to confirm them. Against this background, we do not regard the levelling of baseless allegations against the TRNC and Turkey and the distortion of facts under any pretext pertaining to the arrest of Mr. Tsiakourmas as friendly conduct, and we strongly protest it.

It is truly regretful and a cause for concern that the European Parliament should become an instrument of Greek Cypriot-Greek propaganda by attempting to politicize intentionally a criminal case which is currently before independent judicial organs. The conduct of an organization which regards itself as the leading champion of democracy and human rights, when it assumes the role of both a court and a judge by setting aside completely the principle of objectivity, is conduct which is devoid of any sense of justice and equity. One would have expected the European Parliament, which at every opportunity refers to the rule of law, to first respect the law itself.

This decision adopted by the European Parliament, which has used this matter as an excuse to create an opportunity to make pronouncements on the Cyprus issue reflecting the well known Greek Cypriot-Greek allegations, is clearly an ill-intentioned decision. The TRNC is neither a State under the occupation of Turkey nor a "local administration", as claimed by the resolution. It seems that the European Parliament, by putting forward baseless allegations of this nature, is somehow disturbed by the fact that Turkey, by exercising her rights and obligations emanating from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, has saved the Turkish Cypriot people from total annihilation and has prevented repetition of similar acts of aggression against Turkish Cypriots. It is also clear that the Parliament has been unable to accept the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is a full fledged sovereign State with its territory, people and democracy, as well as respect for human rights.

By adopting this attitude, the European Parliament has once again demonstrated that it cannot in any way contribute positively to the search for

conciliation in Cyprus. We strongly deplore this one-sided position of the European Parliament, and call upon it to adopt a more realistic and constructive approach.

United Nations S/2001/428

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement on the release of the "Djakova/Djakovica group" issued on 26 April 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Pierre **Schori**
Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

01-35519 (E) 010501 010501

Annex to the letter dated 27 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the release of the "Djakova/Djakovica group" issued on 26 April 2001 by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union

The European Union welcomes the decision by the Serbian Supreme Court to release the 145 Kosovo Albanians of the so-called Djakova/Djakovica group. These persons were collectively sentenced in May 2000 to prison terms of between 7 and 13 years for acts of terrorism allegedly carried out during the NATO campaign in 1999.

This constitutes a further act by Belgrade to rectify politically biased sentences passed during the Milosevic regime. The European Union now expects Serbia to complete the review of the remaining cases as rapidly as possible, in order to correct the injustices of the Milosevic era. That would constitute another confidence-building measure, conducive to a reduction of tensions.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

United Nations S/2001/429

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Liberia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith a self-explanatory letter dated 30 April 2001, addressed to you by the President of the Republic of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor (see annex).

The original of the letter has been delivered to the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Monrovia for onward transmission.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Famatta R. **Osode**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-35525 (E) 010501

Annex to the letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Liberia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We refer to our letter of 21 March 2001 in which we informed you of the successful efforts made by the Government of Liberia to comply with Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). We also proposed the establishment of credible and transparent mechanisms to confirm and verify the compliance of the Government of Liberia. While awaiting a response to our letter, we have presented to the United Nations Office in Liberia the complete dossier of evidence substantiating our compliance. We were also pleased to have presented similar information to Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani during his familiarization visit to the region. It is our hope that the Government of Liberia will be afforded the opportunity of addressing any outstanding concerns the Council may have in respect of our compliances prior to the 7 May 2001 deadline.

As a founding member of the United Nations, Liberia recognizes its obligations to fully comply with the demands of the Council. We are also aware of the disastrous effects that sanctions will have on our war-weary population. The country has not recovered from the trauma of its seven-year civil war, which completely destroyed its basic economic and social infrastructure. These problems have been exacerbated in the last two years by at least six armed incursions into Lofa County, out of the neighbouring Republic of Guinea. The most recent attack, which is still ongoing, has claimed the lives of hundreds of Liberians, including our Minister of Youth and Sports, and forced massive displacement of the inhabitants of the area, resulting in deteriorating humanitarian conditions. In effect, Lofa County, the bread basket of Liberia, has been turned into a wasteland.

The Government of Liberia was pleased to have received your recent statement, in which you "... underscored the need to address the underlying causes of this growing instability". However, Liberia continues to be the subject of a concerted military aggression. Forces loyal to the Government of Liberia have captured and presented to ECOWAS arms and ammunition supplied to the new Sierra Leonean army. No doubt, you recall the objection of Liberia to the recruitment, training and arming of Liberians as members of the new British-trained-and-equipped Sierra Leonean army. Additionally, we have confirmed reports that the Kamajors of Sierra Leone are currently participating in this bloodletting inside Liberia. The stated objective of this atrocious enterprise is to oust the Liberian Government by force of arms.

Of grave concern is the denial by the Security Council, under such hostile circumstances, of the right of a Member State to defend its sovereignty and citizens by the imposition of an arms embargo. The Government feels compelled to remind you that the first attack on Liberia occurred immediately after the arms and ammunition collected from Liberia's civil war were destroyed at the request of the Security Council. It is reasonable to expect that, with the imposition of an arms embargo on Liberia, the Council devolved upon itself the responsibility to engage in the collective defence of Liberia's territory. However, the apparent unwillingness, on the part of the Security Council, to be so engaged leaves the Liberian Government to wonder whether Liberia is not a victim of a carefully designed international conspiracy to subvert its Government and cause a free, orderly and peaceful people to be exterminated.

Of equal interest to the Liberian Government is the suggestion that the resolution imposes a regime of "smart sanctions", which are specifically targeted against only senior government officials and the domestic diamond-mining sector of our economy. Diamond mining in Liberia employs thousands of Liberians. This enterprise represents the only means of livelihood for a sizeable section of our population, in a country already saddled with over 85 per cent formal unemployment and 80 per cent of the population under absolute poverty. Compounded with this malaise is the international stigma which will be generated by the imposition of sanctions. Undoubtedly, foreign investments as well as development and humanitarian assistance will be discouraged; the task of rehabilitating shattered Liberian lives will be impeded; the reconstruction of our collapsed national infrastructure will be frustrated.

The destruction of our public infrastructure during the civil war was 70 per cent countrywide. To date, only 15 per cent has been rehabilitated so there still remains a huge gap in terms of rebuilding the public infrastructure to its pre-war level. Eighty per cent of the water and electricity facilities were damaged and have not yet been repaired. It will require over US$ 100 million to rehabilitate the hydropower station that was used to generate electricity to Monrovia and its environs. Our country has a high debt burden that currently stands at 3 billion, which needs to be reduced drastically before we have any macroeconomic framework programme with IMF and the World Bank.

The other social problem currently facing Liberia is the increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS, which stands at 8.2 per cent of the population of about 2.9 million. HIV/AIDS in particular affects the population between 14 and 49 years, which is the most productive age group in the country. The National Drug Service is funded by external resources, which have been drastically reduced to a level of 20 per cent and are further declining. The country will, therefore, soon face an acute shortage of drugs, which will have a severe impact, in particular on our women and children. Given the current weak economy and the war in Lofa County, my Government has not been able to meet its obligations within the social sector. In particular, if the food-for-work programme, which has been put in place to compensate school teachers, is reduced or stopped, it will negate the significant gains achieved over the last three years of up to 1 million children enrolled in school with a severe decline in the number of children attending school. Considering the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the country, the imposition of sanctions will inevitably and adversely impact on the quality of life and well-being of our common people, especially the women and children.

The Liberian Government hopes that by our voluntary imposition of a four-month moratorium on the export of diamonds, and by correspondingly proscribing the entry into Liberia of rough uncertificated diamonds from countries with certification regimes, we would have adequately addressed the concerns of the Security Council in relation to the alleged smuggling of Sierra Leonean diamonds. We remain hopeful that the four-month period will be sufficient to test the resolve and commitment of the Government and subsequently provide the technical assistance needed to establish its own certification regime.

Notwithstanding the objection of the Liberian Government, the resolution seeks to establish a nexus between the progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone and compliance by Liberia with the demands of the Security Council. Indications a e

that there continues to be progress reported in the peace process in Sierra Leone — a ceasefire agreement entered into by RUF and the Sierra Leonean Government continues to hold; UNAMSIL continues to deploy deeper into RUF-controlled areas; weapons seized from peacekeepers are being returned; and confidence is being built on the sides of both the peacekeepers and the belligerents.

The Liberian Government believes that this process must be fully supported by the Security Council and all other members of the international community and accelerated to include the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the belligerents. These positive developments should, therefore, undermine any basis for the imposition of sanctions on Liberia.

Finally, the Government of Liberia does not believe that the underlying intent of the Security Council is to necessarily have the resolution implemented, but rather to afford the Liberian Government adequate opportunity and sufficient time to avoid its implementation by honestly addressing the concerns of and fully complying with the demands of the Council. The Government of Liberia believes it has successfully accomplished this objective. With this consideration, the Government renews its request to have it presented with any information or evidence that may contravene this fact, to facilitate its timely reaction. Unfortunately, inaccurate representations, persuading the Council to believe that Liberia could not be trusted, have been provided to the Council, in the recent past, by apparently misinformed but respected members of the Council.

The Government of Liberia avails itself of the opportunity to reiterate its unwavering commitment to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respectfully requests that you circulate this letter among members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Charles G. **Taylor**

United Nations A/55/923–S/2001/430

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 May 2001
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters on the same subject, I have the honour to convey to you hereunder a list of the violations and infringements that were committed by Israel against Lebanon in the period from 9 to 18 April 2001. Lebanon regards these incidents as an extension of Israel's aggression against its people and territory and as being in flagrant violation of international law.

9 April 2001

Between 1000 and 1130 hours an Israeli Poclain-type bulldozer was engaged in earthmoving and fortification work at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1200 and 1245 hours there were five unexplained explosions in the part of the occupied Shab'a farmlands towards the occupied territories.

10 April 2001

Between 1110 and 1140 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa and the North at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1850 and 1910 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Radar outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas.

At 1900 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Ramta hill outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands fired two 120-mm mortar rounds at surrounding areas.

At 1925 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas.

Between 1940 and 2000 hours an Israeli helicopter flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

01-35607 (E) 040501 070501

Between 2220 and 2245 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1320 and 1330 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Radar outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas. There was also an explosion in the vicinity of the same outpost.

12 April 2001

At 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Bint Jubayl area at high altitudes.

Between 1100 and 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

At 1810 hours an Israeli gunboat (hull number 814) penetrated some 400 metres inside Lebanese territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah. It was accompanied by a rubber dingy with three Israeli soldiers on board, and it remained some 50 metres from the shore. At 1840 hours they both left in the direction of the territorial waters of occupied Palestine. In connection with the foregoing, at 1810 hours a body had been seen tossing about in the sea and being carried towards the Lebanese shore off Ra's al-Naqurah by the waves. The aforementioned rubber dingy approached and took the body on board. It transpired that the body was that of an Israeli fisherman and that they had found it at the boundary between Lebanese territorial waters and those of occupied Palestine (Ra's al-Abyad locality).

13 April 2001

Between 1600 and 1610 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around the Ramta hill outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands with medium-weapons fire.

At 1210 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around the Radar outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands with automatic-weapons fire.

At 1255 hours Israeli forces at one of the outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands fired a direct-fire round that impacted in the vicinity of Birkat al-Naqqar opposite the town of Kafr Shuba in the liberated territories.

14 April 2001

Between 0000 and 0010 hours Israeli forces at the Radar outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands launched two illumination flares and fired four 120-mm mortar rounds that impacted in the Shahal locality opposite Shab'a towards the liberated territories.

At 0015 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around the Radar outpost with medium-weapons fire.

At 1322 hours the radar installation at Beirut International Airport informed the air intelligence branch that two enemy "targets" were circling over the Western Bekaa and Ba'labakk area. They left Lebanese airspace at 1515 hours without incident.

Between 1420 and 1500 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Summaqah, Ruwaysat al-Alam and Radar outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas. They also fired

several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar rounds at the Birkat Ba'tha'il vicinity, the outskirts of Mazra'at Bistra, Birkat al-Naqqar and the Riba' al-Tin area in the liberated Lebanese territories from their positions at Zibdin and Ayn al-Tinah inside the occupied territories. Two Israeli helicopters also flew over the same outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1550 and 1600 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the road between Naqqar Shab'a and Kafr Shuba in the liberated Lebanese territories, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

15 April 2001

At 1120 hours one of the Israeli enemy troops posted opposite the Lebanese border inside the occupied territories fired one light-weapons round into the air in order to panic the Lebanese citizens on the Lebanese side of the Fatimah gate.

Between 1100 and 1600 hours a bulldozer belonging to the Israeli enemy forces was engaged in excavation work inside the occupied territories along the Lebanese border south of Ghajar with the assistance of an Israeli patrol consisting of three M-113 armoured personnel carriers. The patrol subsequently left with the bulldozer in the direction of the occupied territories in northern Palestine.

At 1515 hours one of the Israeli enemy soldiers posted at the Abbad position opposite outlying areas of Hula fired several light-weapons rounds into the air in order to cause panic.

At 1610 hours a slow-moving enemy "target" violated Lebanese airspace west of Damur, circling between Khaldah and Damur on a course that took it 5 nautical miles out to sea and 2 inland and leaving Lebanese airspace at 1903 hours.

16 April 2001

Between 0920 and 0950 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier in the Tyre area.

Between 1125 and 1320 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Bekaa, the North and Mount Lebanon breaking the sound barrier and releasing heat balloons in the Jazzin area and off Batrun.

Between 1500 and 1505 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Lebanese territorial waters off Tyre at very high altitudes.

Between 1825 and 1925 hours Israeli forces at the Ramta hill and Mazra'at Fashkul outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas.

17 April 2001

At intervals between 0900 and 1215 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes. An Israeli reconnaissance aircraft also flew over the Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1445 and 1505 hours Israeli warplanes circled over the sea 7 nautical miles off Shikka at very high altitudes before heading south at a distance of some 2 nautical miles from the Lebanese coast.

18 April 2001

Between 0850 and 0900 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 0940 and 0955 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, Mount Lebanon and the North at very high altitudes.

At 0750 hours overflights by Israeli warplanes were reported in the Arqub area.

At 0940 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South as far as the occupied Shab`a farmlands and Bint Jubayl as well as coastal areas of Iqlim al-Kharrub.

At 0910 hours Israeli enemy warplanes flew over the occupied Shab`a farmlands as far as the liberated village of Mazra`at al-Majidiyah.

At 1005 hours Israeli enemy warplanes overflew the Marj Uyun area at moderate altitude.

At 1200 hours a number of medium-weapons rounds were heard being fired from the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab`a farmlands and enemy reconnaissance aircraft also overflew the area.

At intervals between 1215 and 1900 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft flew over the Jazzin area and the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

At 1500 hours the outskirts of Shab`a town received bursts of fire from inside the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

At 2010 hours an Israeli enemy gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched an illumination flare over the area.

At 2230 hours vehicles were heard on the move near Birkat al-Naqqar in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

At 2300 hours an Israeli enemy gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched an illumination flare over the surrounding area.

Like the previous Israeli violations of which it represents a continuation, this latest series is in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of Lebanon's sovereignty and poses a threat to stability in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/56/64–S/2001/431

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 May 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Item 30 of the preliminary list*
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 30 April 2001 and its annexes from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nagorny Karabakh, Ms. Naira Melkounian, addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under item 30 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Movses **Abelian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/56/50.

01-35601 (E) 080501 090501

Annex I to the letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

In connection with the recent circulation as a document of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council of the text of the statement made by the President of Azerbaijan at the negotiations on a Karabakh settlement held in Key West on 3 April 2001 presenting the Azerbaijani version of the history and prehistory of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, I believe that it is necessary to state the following. The authorities of the Republic of Nagorny Karabakh have always sought to refrain from discussing the problems of the past in the belief that this is unproductive as far as the search for a solution to the Karabakh problem is concerned and that the sides should concentrate their efforts, first and foremost, on building a peaceful and stable future for the region. Although it is, of course, undeniable that the current state of the Caucasus is weighed down, in many respects, by the heavy historical legacy resulting from the region's having been for centuries a geopolitical crossroads where the interests of various powers — Persian, Ottoman, Russian, Soviet — clashed.

However, it must regrettably be noted that our opponents are adhering to entirely the opposite position, waging an ever more active propaganda campaign and provoking us into sterile polemics. A fresh example of this is the aforementioned statement made by the President of Azerbaijan in Key West, in which he essentially reaffirmed the policy formulated by him back at the beginning of 1999: "We must continue in the future to create such works so that they will demonstrate invariably and consistently that the lands where Armenia is now situated belong to Azerbaijan. We must do this. We must open up the way for future generations" (*Bakinsky rabochy*, 11 February 1999).

This official State strategy of Azerbaijan was also reflected in the aforementioned statement by Heydar Aliyev, fully confirming our fears. In order to prevent in future the one-sided interpretation of the events of the past, which is fraught with negative consequences for the future of the south Caucasus, and to establish an objective historical basis for searching for a settlement to the conflict, we consider it necessary to submit a memorandum setting forth the indisputable scientific facts concerning the history of the region alongside their Azerbaijani interpretation. We should be extremely grateful if this memorandum were circulated as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

(*Signed*) Naira **Melkounian**

Annex II to the letter dated 30 April 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Memorandum

Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Transcaucasia

Azerbaijan's version

The Armenian community arrived recently in Transcaucasia, Armenians appeared in the region in the nineteenth century. "Following the signing between Russia and Iran of the Giulistan and Turkmenchai peace treaties, mass settlement by Armenians began in the historically Azerbaijani lands, and a policy aimed at creating an Armenian State was pursued in the south Caucasus. Simultaneously, a process of banishing and deporting Azerbaijanis from lands that had been theirs since time immemorial was implemented".[1] The Chairman of the Milli Mejlis, Aleskerov, said that "the genocide of Azerbaijanis has been under way since the beginning of the nineteenth century, since the time of the signing between Russia and Iran of the Treaties of Giulistan and Turkmenchai, since the time of the migration of Armenians from Iran and other countries of the Near East to Azerbaijan, in particular, Karabakh, Erevan and Nakhichevan".[2]

The facts

According to the testimony of the classical authors Herodotus (fifth century BC), Strabo (first century BC) and others, the north-eastern border of Armenia was the river Kura. Nagorny Karabakh was part of the tenth province of Armenia, Artsakha. The creator of the Armenian written language, Mesrop Mashtots, founded the first school in Armenia with instruction based on the new Armenian alphabet (in 405) in the Amaras Monastery in the Martuni district of Nagorny Karabakh.

Another fact refuting Azerbaijan's fantasies that the Armenian community appeared in the region only in the nineteenth century is the correspondence of the Armenian princes of Karabakh over the course of many years with the Russian court and certain European powers, which began in the first quarter of the eighteenth century and has been preserved in document form.[3] During the period of Persian rule, in order to develop handicrafts in Iran, many Karabakh craftsmen were sent, along with their families, to various regions of Iran. After the annexation of Armenia and Karabakh to Russia, they began to return to their homeland.

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[1] Address by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, to the Azerbaijani people, *Bakinsky rabochy*, 30 March 2000, p. 1.

[2] Presentation in the Milli Mejlis of the book *Tragicheskie stranitsy nashei istorii: genotsid*, 1 April 2001.

[3] See Russian Foreign Policy Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, fnd.100, Cent. Asia, 1739, d.2, sh.62; fnd.100, Cent. Asia, 1724, d.4, sh.17; fnd.100, Cent. Asia, 1724, d.4, sh.16; Central State Archives of Ancient Documents, fnd. Office of Peter the Great, sect. II, bk.66, sh.541-541; fnd. Office of Peter the Great, sect.II, bk.66, sh.520; S. A. Mamedov, *Istoricheskie svyazi azerbaidjanskogo i armyanskogo naroda (vtoraya polovina XVII v. i pervaya tret XVIII v.)*, Baku, 1977, pp. 216-239.

Information regarding this is also to be found in the writings of Azerbaijani historians.[4] The famous Russian writer and public figure, Russia's ambassador to Persia, A. S. Griboedov, perished because of the assistance that he provided for this process. As for the Turkic tribes from whom the modern-day Azerbaijani community is descended, they began to arrive in Transcaucasia between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries of the Common Era.[5] They appeared in Nagorny Karabakh only in the last third of the eighteenth century[6] and never constituted more than 3 to 4 per cent of the population, right up to the incorporation of Nagorny Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 1921.

The largest wave of migration to Transcaucasia by a Turkic-speaking population occurred, however, at the end of the nineteenth century. It is appropriate to cite, in this connection, some data from Azerbaijani history. "In 1897, the Azerbaijani population in the territory of Baku and Elizavetopol *gubernii* numbered about 1 million persons. However, according to data that are far from complete, from 1880, the number of seasonal workers from the north-western provinces of southern Azerbaijan alone was between 30,000 and 35,000 persons per year. In reality, there were far more: many seasonal workers did not obtain consular arrival certificates or passports and crossed the frontier illegally. The districts of Velkidzh and Ardebil alone each provided almost 20,000 seasonal workers per year, that is one person on average from every peasant homestead. The majority of seasonal workers from southern Azerbaijan settled in enterprises in Baku".[7] It turns out that, according to data that are far from complete, out of 1 million Azerbaijanis living in Baku and Elizavetopol *gubernii*, at least 600,000 (60 per cent) had come from the territory of Iran, beginning in 1880. In fact, the number is even higher, as Azerbaijani academics themselves confirm. The very name "Azerbaijan", as applied to the territory of modern-day Azerbaijan, appeared only in 1918, when the "Musavat" party, which had come to power in Baku, was pursuing the goal of legitimizing its subsequent claims to the contiguous provinces of Iran (western and eastern Azerbaijan). The ethnic classification "Azerbaijanis" appeared only in the 1930s. Prior to this, they were referred to as "Caucasian Tatars" or "Turks" in all Russian and Soviet sources.

Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the period of the Soviet Union

Azerbaijan's version

The leaders of the Soviet Union conducted a policy of deporting Azerbaijanis. "With the help of Soviet Russia, Zangezur and a number of other Azerbaijani lands were declared the territory of Armenia. Through a decision by the leaders of the USSR, who were carrying out a policy of discrimination against the Turkic Muslim

[4] *Istoria Azerbaidjana (v 3-kh tomakh)* edited by the academicians I. A. Guseinov, A. S. Sumbatzade and others, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, Baku, 1960, vol. 2 – "*Ot prisoedinenica Azerbaijana k Rossii do fevralskoy burzhuazno-demokraticheskoy revolyutsii 1917 goda*", pp. 22-23.

[5] *Istoria Azerbaidjana*, 1958, vol. 1 – "*Sdrevneishikh vremen do prisoedinenia Azerbaijana k Rossii*", pp. 140, 170-172, 202 and 204.

[6] Ibid., p. 337.

[7] *Istoria Azerbaidjana*, vol. 2, pp. 253, 261 and 262.

republics, Armenians achieved the mass deportation of Azerbaijanis from their historical lands during the period from 1948 to 1953 at the State level".[8]

The facts

In 1918, Armenia became an independent republic. Its territory at that time comprised approximately 60,000 square kilometres.[9] Subsequently, the Bolsheviks and Turkey, having imposed on Armenia the Moscow Treaty of 1921, dismembered it, whereby Azerbaijan was given considerable territory, including Nakhichevan together with the contiguous districts. Having also seized Nagorny Karabakh from Armenia, the Bolsheviks reduced the territory of Armenia to 29,800 square kilometres. In addition, "in terms of national composition, the population in Armenia is considerably more homogenous than in Georgia and Azerbaijan. According to the 1922 census, Armenians constitute 85.98 per cent, Turkic and Persian peoples together — 9.8 per cent, and Russians — 2.45 per cent. National minorities lived scattered throughout Armenia and taken together do not exceed 19 per cent in any *uyezd*. The predominant nationality, in contrast to Georgia and Azerbaijan, is represented in the cities to a larger degree, than in villages: Armenians in the cities constitute 91.7 per cent of the population, and in villages 84.7 per cent".[9] In addition, "the civil war during the period 1917-1920, which to a considerable extent was complicated in Azerbaijan by the national factor, led to significant displacements of the population tending mainly to reduce the size of national minorities. Thus, for example, the Russian population diminished from 200,000 in 1913 to 120,000 in 1921. The same mass displacement also occurred among the Armenian population, which earlier constituted rather large islands along the general Turkic population, numbering overall 73,526 persons in the Shemakha, Geokchai, Agdash, Nukhi, Sheki *uyezds*; by 1921 of them there remained a total of 12,716 persons". [10]

History of the origin of the conflict

Azerbaijan's version

> "This conflict arose in connection with territorial claims concerning Azerbaijan on the part of Armenia, which was attempting to seize and annex part of the land that has been Azerbaijani since time immemorial — Nagorny Karabakh. It began in 1988, when Armenia and Azerbaijan were still Union Republics within the Soviet Union. However, as a result of the unjust position taken by the leaders of the Soviet Union with regard to Azerbaijan and, possibly, also an unwillingness to avert the conflict, it developed further and expanded into a war. I should like to point out that, in 1921, the Azerbaijani Government granted the Nagorny Karabakh region of Azerbaijan the status of an autonomous region, and it enjoyed all the rights of autonomy. Therefore, there were no objective reasons for the start of this conflict."[11]

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[8] Address by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, to the Azerbaijani people, *Bakinsky rabochy*, 30 March 2000, p. 1.

[9] *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, vol., III, section on the Armenian SSR, 1926, p. 419.

[10] Ibid., vol. I, section on the Azerbaijani SSR, 1926, p. 642.

[11] Statement of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mr. Heydar Alivey, made at the meeting of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Colin Powell, with the Presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia and the co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group in Key West, Florida, on 3 April 2001.

The facts

The League of Nations included the question of Nagorny Karabakh on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, basing its decision, inter alia, on the 1919 Agreement between the National Council of Nagorny Karabakh and the Government of Azerbaijan, in which the parties agreed that the question of Nagorny Karabakh must be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference.[12] On the very next day after the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, Azerbaijan twice — on 30 November and then 1 December 1920 — declared its refusal to put forward any claims to all disputed territories, including Nagorny Karabakh. On 4 July 1921, at the plenary session of the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, a proposal by the Azerbaijani side to include Nagorny Karabakh within Azerbaijan was rejected, and a decision was taken to include Nagorny Karabakh in Armenia. It was decided to hold a plebiscite only in Nagorny Karabakh. However, on 5 July 1921, under pressure from Stalin a plenary session of the Caucasus Bureau adopted, without discussion and a vote, a resolution under which Nagorny Karabakh was included in Azerbaijan. Precisely this illegal decision taken without lawful authority by a regional party organ of the Bolsheviks and adopted without taking any account of the will of the Karabakh population, to this day enables the leaders of Azerbaijan to impart legitimacy to their claims to Karabakh and other Armenian territories.

Prior to 1988, the question of reuniting Karabakh with Armenia was raised in the 1920s, 1940s and 1960s. Throughout the entire period in which Nagorny Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan that Republic's authorities conducted a discriminatory policy, which became particularly pronounced when Heydar Aliyev came into power. "One can state without exaggeration that, only after Heydar Aliyev assumed the leadership of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh Azerbaijanis felt that they were the complete masters of the area. In the 1970s, considerable work was being carried out there. All this led to an influx into Nagorny Karabakh of the Azerbaijani population from surrounding districts — Lachin, Agdam, Djebrail, Fizuli, Agjabedi and others. All these measures, carried out thanks to the foresight of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, favoured the influx of the Azerbaijani population. Whereas in 1970 the proportion of Azerbaijanis in the population of the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region amounted to 18 per cent, in 1979 it was 23 per cent, and in 1989 it exceeded 30 per cent".[13] From 1926 to 1980, 85 Armenian villages (30 per cent) and not a single Azerbaijani village had disappeared in Nagorny Karabakh. Between the censuses from 1970 to 1979, the size of the Armenian population in the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region had increased by 1.7 per cent (2,000 persons), while the number of Azerbaijanis had increased by 37 per cent (10,000 persons). Over a period of 40 years (1939-1978), the number of Azerbaijanis in the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region had increased 2.6 times, while the number of Armenians had diminished by 7.3 per cent. In 20 years (1959-1979), the number of Azerbaijanis in Armenia had increased by 49 per cent, while the number of Armenians in Azerbaijan had grown by only 7.5 per cent. The rate of natural increase of the population in the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region was one of

[12] "*League of Nations*", *Records of the First Assembly*, Meetings of Committee II, Geneva, 1920, pp. 173 and 174; "*K istorii obrazovania Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaijanskoy SSR (1918-1925)*", documents and materials, Baku, 1989, pp. 23-25.

[13] Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Ramil Ulsubov, "*Nagorny Karabakh, missia spasenia nachinalas b 70-e gody*", *Panorama*, 12 May 1999.

the highest in the USSR. Accordingly, in 1955, it constituted 25.1 per 1,000 inhabitants, in 1956 — 28.8, and in 1961 — 32.[14] The Armenian population completely disappeared in various regions of Azerbaijan, particularly in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

Azerbaijan's chauvinistic policy was accompanied by the destruction of Armenian historical and cultural monuments throughout the territory of Azerbaijan. A glaring example of this was the Dadivank Monastery in the Kelbajar district. "The local Muslim population regarded it as a remnant of the Armenian Christian religion and destroyed it as much as it could. I appealed at the time — this was in the middle of the 1980s — to the First Secretary of the Kelbajar district committee requesting him to halt the destruction of monuments. The reply that I heard is something that disturbs me even now: 'What is this Armenian monastery have to do with you?'"[15]

The legal side of the Karabakh conflict

Azerbaijan's arguments to the effect that Nagorny Karabakh belongs to it are unconvincing also from the legal point of view. When the Azerbaijan Republic was recognized by the international community in 1992, Nagorny Karabakh was not part of it. On 10 December 1991, the people of Nagorny Karabakh, in compliance with all the laws of the USSR in effect at that time and the norms of international law, including the USSR Law on the procedure for deciding questions related to the secession of a Union Republic from the USSR, which was adopted on 3 April 1990 and gives the right to autonomous entities and nationalities concentrated in specific areas to decide independently the question of their State legal status in cases involving the secession of a Union Republic from the Soviet Union, expressed their desire for independence in a referendum with the presence of international observers on 30 August 1991, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan declared the restoration of the State independence of the Azerbaijani Republic of 1918-1920. Nagorny Karabakh, however, was not part of the independent Azerbaijani Republic of 1918-1920, which was confirmed by the League of Nations. Nagorny Karabakh was transferred by Soviet power to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, official Baku, having adopted the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Azerbaijani Republic on 18 August 1991, declared the illegality of the establishment of Soviet power and rejected the Soviet legal and political legacy. In doing so, Baku itself in fact recognized as illegal the 70-year-long forceful retention of Nagorny Karabakh within the Azerbaijani SSR.

25 April 2000

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[14] *"Dostizhenia Sovetskogo NK za 40 let v tsifrakh"*, statistical collection, Stepanakert, 1963, p. 39.

[15] Haji Iskander, *"Lel kala — takaya blizkaya i takaya nedosyagalmaya krepost"*, *Vyskha* No. 10, pp. 16-23, March 2000.

United Nations A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 May 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 1 May 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Israeli Government continues to pursue its bloody military campaign, which began on 28 September 2000, against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, causing more Palestinian deaths and injuries and destruction of property, and terrorizing the Palestinian civilian population under its occupation.

Yesterday, 30 April 2001, an explosion was set off in the city of Ramallah, completely destroying a two-storey building and killing three people, including a 7-year-old Palestinian boy and his 3-year-old sister. The Israeli occupying forces had apparently been targeting the man who was killed in that blast, 24-year-old Hassan Qadi. The explosion thus represents another criminal method being used by the Israeli occupying forces to continue carrying out the illegal practice of extrajudicial killings.

Further, two other explosions were also set off in the Gaza Strip yesterday, which resulted in the killing of three more Palestinians. In addition to the deaths caused by such violent and brutal actions, committed with absolutely no regard for international humanitarian law and the lives of innocent civilians in residential areas, several other civilians were injured and severe structural damage was caused by both the Ramallah and Gaza bombing explosions.

We hold the Israeli Government fully responsible for the above-mentioned actions and their serious consequences, which represent additional war crimes being committed by the occupying Power against the Palestinian civilian population under its occupation. Moreover, we reiterate that such actions are akin to state terrorism being perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian people.

In follow-up to our previous letters to you on this critical issue, dated from 29 September 2000 to 26 April 2001 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-

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S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; and A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418), I wish to draw your attention to the fact that, since our last letter, 10 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to this letter.) These killings, resulting from the use of excessive force through numerous military means being used by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000, bring the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 437 people. It is clear that while the international community continues to fail to intervene in the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, the number of Palestinian deaths and injuries continues to rise as Israel persists with its bloody military campaign.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan A. **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Thursday, 26 April to Tuesday, 1 May 2001)

Thursday, 26 April 2001

Atef Ahmed Wahdan

Saturday, 28 April 2001

Emad Dawoud Karaa'kia

Monday, 30 April 2001

1. Adnan Asa'ad Marzouk
2. Hamdi Selim Al Madhoun
3. Abdel Karim Abu Khaled (18 years old)
4. Hasan Al Qadi
5. Jamal Barakat (7 years old)
6. Malak Jamal Barakat (3 years old)
7. Wael Khalil Abu Muheisen

Tuesday, 1 May 2001

Mohammed Suleiman Abu Jazar

* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 = 437.